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Skype is a very popular VoIP software which has recently attracted the atten-
tion of the research community and network operators; furthermore Skype uses
a proprietary signalling design and its source code is unavailable. This makes its
analysis really important since the classification of IP flows becomes increasingly
crucial in modern network management platforms. Traditional classification sys-
tems based on packet headers are rapidly becoming ineffective. In this work after a
general analysis of Skype protocol and traffic in both time and frequency domain,
a new classification method is presented. It is based on statical classification of
the flow, using only three basic properties of IP packets: their size, interarrival
time and order of arrival. The whole process is based on a new quantity called
Protocol Fingerprint. Its aim is to express these quantities in an efficient way.
An important part in the classification process is taken by a Gaussian filter that
smooths the protocol fingerprints avoiding misclassifications caused by any kind
of noise generated in the network. Even if this technique is at an early stage of
development and requires more work, it is quite promising.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Voice over IP (VoIP) has been very popular in the last few years due to its low
cost, high quality, and ease of use. These years have witnessed VoIP telephony
gaining a tremendous popularity, as also testified by the increasing number of
operators that are offering VoIP-based phone services to residential users. Skype
is beyond doubt the most amazing example of this new phenomenon: developed
by the creators of KaZaa, it recently reached over 10 millions of users, becoming
so popular that people indicate Skype IDs in their visiting cards. A number of
reasons could explain this success. First, today Internet (capacity, responsiveness,
robustness) makes it possible and easy to provide new and demanding services,
like real-time applications; second, the user’s attitude towards technology has
improved in the last years. People are willing to accept a good service for free,
even though service continuity and quality may not be guaranteed. Everybody
likes acceding from the same terminal and the same application enviroment to a
plenty of different communication facilities. Skype is an extremely good piece of
software, carefully engineered, user firendly and efficient at the same time. This
very popular VoIP software has attracted the attention of the research community
and network operators.
It is a famous peer-to-peer application since its launch in 2003. However, none
of Skype’s algorithms or its protocol specifications are available for a general dis-
cussion or inspection, which impedes evaluation from a security perspective. This
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point is critical, since Skype uses strong encryption mechanisms that make it re-
ally difficult to even glimpse its presence from a traffic aggregate. The importance
of Skype traffic identification (besides being instrumental to traffic analysis and
characterization for network design and provisioning) is clear when considering
the interest of network operators, ranging from traffic and performance monitor-
ing, to design or tariff policies and traffic differentiation strategy. Skype is having
a serious impact on carrier’s revenue streams, but perhaps the most important
aspect is that the nature of Skype traffic is raising security concerns, especially
for large enterprise networks. Skype uses a unique peer-to-peer technology, as
said, making tedious for operators to identify, classify and manage the associated
traffic.
It is important to underline that despite the interest and the work recently
done by the research community, reliable identification of Skype traffic remains a
challenging task, given that the software is propietary and the traffic is obfuscated.
In general, effective traffic identification, detection and classification requires three
key elements:
 Accuracy: the technique should have low false positive (identifying other
protocols as targeted protocol X).
 Scalability: the technique must be able to process large traffic volumes in
the order of several thousands to several million connections at a time, with
good accuracy, without being computationally too expensive.
 Robustness: traffic measurement in the middle of the network has to deal
with the effects of asymmetric routing (two directions of a connection follow
different paths), packet losses and reordering.
Of course there are tradeoffs in terms of level of accuracy, scalability and ro-
bustness that can be achieved relative to the detection of any given protocol or
service. One current classification practice consists of TCP/UDP port number
2
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application identification using known TCP/UDP port numbers to identify traffic
flows. This method is highly scalable since only the TCP/UDP port numbers
must be recorded to identify a particular application. It is also highly robust
since a single packet is sufficient to make a succesful identification. Unfortunately
port number-based identification is increasingly inaccurate primarily due to the
fact that P2P networks (such as that one of Skype) tend to intentionally disguise
their generated traffic in order to circumvent filtering firewalls. The majority of
P2P networks now operate on top of custom-designed propietary protocols and
their clients can easily operate on any port number even HTTP’s port 80, mak-
ing port based detection schemes incapable of accurate and robust classification
of Internet protocols. To overcome the issues with port-based detection, a new
technique that processes packet payloads for patterns signatures that univocally
identify any given protocol can be used. One challenge facing payload-signature
techniques on telecom networks is the high speed at which such pattern matching
algorithms should operate. It is therefore critical to design algorithms that can
efficiently perform pattern matching while simultaneously dealing with memory
and CPU limitations.
Another challenge is the lack of knowledge about reliable protocol specifica-
tions. This is due to the development history and to the propietary nature of many
protocols. For application detection and classification to be reliable and accurate,
it is important to identify signatures that span all the variants (or at least the
dominant used ones). However, it is common to see new application using 128-
bit or 256-bit bit encryption techniques to defend the privacy of the information
exchanged between their users. As a consequence, the payload-signature method
fails when traffic is encrypted, because the signatures in the packet payload are
scrambled by the encryption. Skype offers a combination of challenges that make
it difficult to detect with scalable, reliable and accurate algorithms:
 The Skype agent does not run on any standard source port. Skype randomly
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selects a soure port for the agent to run on, then communicates via either
TCP or UDP, or both. The choice of the protocol that Skype uses depends
on whether the agent is behind a proxy/NAT or has a public IP addres. The
destination IP addresses are not the same every time Skype runs, and the
destination port numbers are also not standard.
 All communication via Skype is encrypted. This means that phone numbers
called (SkypeOut) or other data are also encrypted. In many cases, there is
no direct communication between end users in Skype. All communication
passes through intermediate nodes, and these nodes may be different for
every call.
 Skype is a peer-to-peer protocol, which means that the peers (IP addresses)
to which a Skype agent connects are many and the network is very dynamic,
so these peers (and thus their IP addresses) keep changing.
 Skype provides voice, chat, file transfer and viceo services. It appears that
all of these services are passed together, making it difficult to separate out
voice, from chat, from video, etc.
To accurately detect and classify these unfriendly applications, it is necessary to
provide a systematic methodology that overcomes the lack of well-known port
numbers or user payload signatures. Instead, any new methodology should ana-
lyze flow connections at the transport layer (Layer 4) to extract and profile key
features from the packet streams processed. Such a method could be referred
to as “classification in the dark”. This kind of analysis can be divided in two
different analysis applications: protocol analysis based on packet inspection and
based on traffic behavior. Packet inspection analysis, as already said, relies on
monitoring traffic passing through the network and inspecting the data payload
of the packets according to some previously defined P2P application signatures.
These signatures consist of regular expressions matching on the application data,
4
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in order to determine whether a special P2P application is being used. Because
protocol analysis focuses on the packet payload and raises alerts only on a defi-
nite match, any client-side tricks that use non-default or dynamic ports to avoid
detection by P2P application will fail. Using this approach, the result is normally
more accurate and believable, but it still has some shortcomings:
 P2P applications are evolving continuously, and therefore signatures can
change. Static signature based matching requires new signatures to be ef-
fective when these occur.
 With more and more P2P identification and control products on the market,
P2P developers tend to tunnel around any controls placed in their way.
They could easily achieve this by encrypting the traffic, such as by using
SSL, making protocol analysis much more difficult.
Any TCP and UDP streams not classified by the Payload-signature applica-
tion should be forwarded to the Behavioral application. Streams of packets with
encrypted payloads, emerging P2P protocols for which a signature is not available,
or multimedia applications using proprietary technologies (such as VoIP, Video,
Gaming, File Transfer, Chat, etc) fall into this family. The behavioural-signature
application profiles the behaviour of hosts at different levels by exploring its so-
cial level (hosts that it communicates with), its functional level (server vs client
vs peer-node), its application level (transport layer interactions between particu-
lar hosts on specific ports) and specific dynamics, with the intent to identify the
application of origin.
A different approach is based on a stochastic characterization of Skype traffic
in terms of the packet arrival rate and packet length, which are used as features
of a decision process based on Naive bayesian Classifiers.
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1.1 Goals of this Work
With the continuous increase of Internet bandwidth and rapid advancement of
P2P applications, VoIP technology has become a communication alternative for
many Internet users. The popular VoIP service Skype uses a propietary signalling
and media protocol for voice calling, instant messaging, audio conferencing and
file tranfers. Additionally all traffic is encrypted. Thus, it is currently not known
what information is exactly transported within the application. This is the reason
why a more detailed knowledge about Skype traffic is necessary, since Skype also
impedes protocol analysis for potential security holes. In this work traffic is only
analysed from a network point of view.
1.2 Thesis Structure
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes key components of Skype
software and Skype network. Chapter 3 reviews all the previous work about
Skype. In chapter 4 the results of the protocol analysis are shown. These results
concern issues both in time and frequency domain. In chapter 5 the concepts of
Self-Similarity and Long-range Dependence are introduced. Their applicability
in estimating the Hurst Parameter of Internet traffic and their applicability to
Skype traffic are tested. In chapter 6 different methods for traffic classification
are analysed. Finally in chapter 7 a statistical method for traffic classification is
tested. In this last chapter it is explained how it is possible to classify traffic using
statistical fingerprints and aspects related the applicability of this technique to
Skype traffic are discussed. A summary about the work required to improve the
classification technique is also presented. Chapter 8 concludes the work.
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Chapter 2
Architecture and Principles of
Operation of Skype
As already written, Skype has gained a tremendous popularity during the last
few years. Hudson Barton [1] made a study on worlwide Skype usage and from
it, by looking at the “concurrent on line” statistic, it is possible to discern trends
and demographics in its growth pattern. Skype will keep growing in 2007 and
2008, adding more than 12 million new real users (to its current 21.3 million).
This is a faster pace than 2006, demostrating that growth remains exponential.
Of course there are regional differentiation, in Asia/Pacific the growth has lagged
other regions but may start to catch up the rest of the world. The problem
could have been the lack of physical infrastructure and political bans (such as in
China, where VoIP is banned by the government). There are also enterprise and
consumer differentiation but anyway regarding Skype profitability, price increases
will not hinder the growth and Skype will struggle less than its competitors in 2007
and 2008: It is becoming a sort of social, collaborative, and borderless network,
supporting concepts of groupware and Web 2.0.
2.1 Network Structure
The first, deep analysis of Skype was done in 2004 [2]. Since then many Skype
versions have been released, but all of them regarded the terminal layout and
7
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features, the core network remained of course the same. Skype is a peer-to-peer
system based on clients developed by KaZaa, that gives the user the possibility
of instant messaging, calling and video-calling other users belonging to Skype
network. There is also the option of video conferencing. In the end, the features
offered make it quite similar to the MSN and Yahoo IM applications, however the
protocol and the techniques used underlying are different. Like almost all other
different peer-to-peer networks, also Skype is formed by different nodes (machine
on which Skype client is running) that communicate with each others. There
are two different Skype node types: an ordinary node and a supernode. A super
node is an ordinary node with a public address and a sufficient CPU, memory
and network bandwidth. This approach clearly favors the overall availability of
the system. It can been shown [3] that the population of the supernodes selected
by Skype, apparently based on reachability and spare bandwidth, tends to be
relatively stable. Skype, therefore, represents an interesting point in the P2P
design space where heterogeneity is leveraged to control churn, not just to cope
with it.
Typically, supernodes mantain an overlay network among themselves, while
ordinary nodes pick one (or a small number of) supernodes to associate with;
supernodes also function as ordinary nodes. Ordinary nodes issue queries through
the supernode(s) they are associated with. An ordinary node must connect to a
supernode and must register with the Skype Login Server for a succesful login.
Skype Login Server is not a node itself but it is fundamental for the functioning of
the network. Usernames and passwords are stored there, and it checks that these
ones are unique. User authentication at login is also done there. This is the only
central server present in the network. But online and oﬄine user information is
always spread around the network, making a research faster.
Another important aspect of Skype is how it deals with NAT and firewall
traversals. It is believed that Skype uses a variant of STUN protocol in order to
8
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Figure 2.1: Skype Network. There are three main entities : supernode, ordinary nodes, and the
login server
determine in which kind of network it is used. It is also believed [2] that there
is no server containing this info, because no exchange of this kind of information
has been found in any experiment.
The existence of supernodes is important in the login phase; every ordinary
node should keep an updated list of reachable nodes. This list is called “host
cache” and it contains IP address and port numbers of super nodes. In [4] a
good ports analysis is done. Skype uses for communacation both UDP and TCP
connections, also together. It has the ability of using also TCP ports 443 (HTTPS)
and 80 (HTTP), in this order. Regarding UDP traffic, it uses arbitrarily set port.
The user can change the used port for UDP (and incoming TCP) traffic. UDP is
the preferred type of connection, but it is not mandatory. It can be shown the a
client is able to login even with only TCP traffic allowed.
9
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2.2 Codecs
So far, VoIP has predominantly been hyped as a mean of cost saving, and this is a
legitimate pitch. But VoIP also lays the groundwork for a revolution in the quality
of voice we communicate with which was somehow blocked by the fixed rate nature
of PSTN. Telephones have remained unchanged for so long that most people have
no idea what limitations they have lived with. This has begun to change with the
recent rise of wideband technologies for the masses such as Skype. Now people are
asking everywhere, “why does Skype sound good?” The answer is that Skype is
capturing double the spectrum of voice frequencies that are captured by standard
telephones.
Standard PSTN, and the overwhelming majority of VoIP telecom codecs, cap-
ture at 8 kHz. Skype can capture at 16 kHz. The added fidelity in the high
frequencies adds substantially to the realism of the reproduction, makes it pos-
sible to distinguish between otherwise difficult phonemes of “s” “f” “c” “e” “d”
and so on, and in an unmeasurable way, creates much more a sense of “being
there” with the other person. The comparison is analagous to that of AM and
FM broadcast fidelity. The bitrate this data is transmitted is a separate topic from
the sample rate of the initial capture. A great codec may minimize the amount
of data needed to be transmitted per second (bitrate), but it can never capture
it any better than the original sampling (sample rate). This is the “buy low, sell
high” of communications. We want the lowest bitrate possible for the highest
sample rate possible... low cost, high quality. There are many codecs available for
this compression / decompression process, but they are almost all tuned for an
8 kHz process. The simple reason for this is that regardless of how high fidelity
a VoIP signal is, as soon as it passes into the PSTN, anything beyond 8 kHz is
discarded. Furthermore, a 16 kHz signal that is downsampled to 8 kHz typically
doesn’t sound as good as one that started at 8 kHz from the start.
Increasing the bandwidth of sound signals from the telephone bandwidth of
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200-3400 Hz to the wider bandwidth of 50-7000 Hz results in increased intelli-
gibility and naturalness of speech and gives a feeling of transparent communica-
tion. The emerging end-to-end digital communication systems enable the use of
wideband speech coding in a wide area of applications. Recognizing the need of
high quality wideband speech codecs, several standardization activities have been
recently conducted, resulting in the selection of a new wideband speech codec,
AMR-WB, at bit rates from 6.6 to 23.85 kbit/s by both 3GPP and ITU-T. The
adoption of AMR-WB by the two bodies is of significant importance since for the
first time the same codec is adopted for wireless as well as wireline services. This
will eliminate the need for transcoding, and ease the implementation of wideband
voice applications and services across a wide range of communication systems and
platforms.
Wideband VoIP only works when VoIP is sent from end to end. With the
prevalence of existing PSTN infrastructure in our lives, pure end-to-end VoIP
links still make up only a small percentage of communications traffic. It seems to
be prevalent folklore that Skype uses what is commonly referred to as “Wideband
iLBC”. To be more accurate, Skype has licensed the VoiceEngine product, which is
a comprehensive solution that includes all of these codecs, as well as a jitter buffer,
error concealment, and echo cancellation technology. The GIPS suite of codecs
includes, among others, iLBC which is a fixed rate codec. But, as indicated on the
Skype website [5], Skype varies its bit rate which could not happen with iLBC.
But in the suite there is also the iSAC codec. According to a GIPS engineer,
The iLBC [6] and iSAC [7] algorithms are pretty much unrelated. iLBC is a
narrowband fixed rate codec operating at 13.3 kbps or 15.2 kbps. The algorithm
is available from IETF (RFC 3951 and 3952). ISAC is an unrelated wideband
variable rate codec, which can adapt its operating rate between 10 kbps and 32
kbps. The codec is proprietary and the algorithm is unavailable. So, though at
times Skype may indeed utilize iLBC, it must at others be using iSAC. Since
11
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Figure 2.2: Schematic diagram representing the Skype message building process
Skype has licensed both (as well as iPCM-wb, another 16 kHz codec).
2.3 Encryption
In [5] it can be read that Skype uses AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), the
same used by the U.S. Government to protect sensitive information. Skype uses
256-bit encryption, that means there are 1.1 x 1077 possible keys for encrypting
data in a call or in a message. Skype uses from 1536 to 2048 bit RSA to negotiate
symmetric AES keys. User public keys are of course certified by Skype central
server at login.
2.4 Framing and Scheduling
Real-time voice communication requires frames to be encapsulated in IP packets
and sent periodically to receivers. A short packet period shortens the mouth-to-
ear delay, but may incur higher loss rates and therefore lower quality.
Considering the voice source, the voice encoder used during a call, for example
the “Voice Coder”, creates blocks of encoded voice. The framer is then addressed
to create Skype frames, by multiplexing into a single frame one or more blocks (in
order, for example, to cope with the potential link loss of the previous frame, or to
generate the message rate). Possibly, video, audio, chat, report data is multiplexed
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together, adding only headers that will specify it. Once created the frame, it is
compressed by the “Archiver” and encrypted by the “Cypher”. Sometimes and
additional non-chiphered header may be present, usually it is called “Start of
Message”, (SoM). In this process there are important parameters, like the Rate
(the bit-rate used by the Codec), the Interval-Time (meaning the framing time)
and the Redundancy Factor, meaning the number of past block that need to be
included in the current frame. Of course these parameters change during the
connection, following the network connection state.
As written in [8] Skype sends voice packets by two rates. In fact it uses
voice activation detection (VAD), it detects an active period while the caller is
speaking and packs frames of 30 ms iLBC (for example) of 50 bytes each into an
UDP packet and transmits the packets every 60 ms. During the silence period,
it trasmits 25 bytes in each UDP packet every 100 ms. No silence suppression is
supported in Skype. It has been observed [2] that packets flow also during silence
period. Sending these packets is useful for two reasons. First, it helps mantaining
UDP bindings at NAT, and second, they are useful for playing some background
noise at the peer. Even if a TCP connection is used, these packets are necessary
for avoiding the connection time out, and the congestion window size drop, which
usually would take few RTTs to reach the maximum level again.
Jitter buffers are used to smooth out variations in packet arrivals. For real-
time applications, the size of the jitter buffers must be chosen properly in order
to balance between the number of arrivals considered late for play-back and the
mouth-to-ear delay. This size could, of course, adaptively change either during
silence periods, or not. Skype uses a simple FIFO approach to handle arrivals
and play-outs. It smoothly plays packets arriving within 60 ms with respect to
the expected arrival time. It also buffers different packets arriving ahead of time
and stores them for playback later. If a packet arrives out of order, it would
be processed following the FIFO rule. The fixed jitter length in Skype is also
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Figure 2.3: Simple Traversal of UDP Through Network Address Translators (STUN)
inadequate, as there is a moderate amount of jitter over 60 ms with respect to
the mean delay for some connection. As we know, loss rate and behaviour in an
Internet path is characterized by being asymmetric, non-stationary and variable.
It follows that a trade-off between the network overhead and the accuracy of
the feed-back must be found. Skype sends/receives feedback every 2 seconds by
encapsulating 4 or 8 bytes of information.
2.5 NAT and Firewall Determination
During some experiments, confirmed also in [2], it has been noticed that Skype
is able to recognize in what kind of network it is situated (e.g. behind what kind
of NAT and what kind of firewall) during the login phase. In fact if the network
situation is changed after the login (for example with a new entry in the firewall
rules list) Skype is not anymore able to connect to any other peer, soon after
the change. It is possible (but not proven, since messages are encrypted) that
Skype refreshes this kind of information, since after a while Skype is able to
connect again. One possible way to get this information is to exchange data with
the Supernode and possibly with more ordinary nodes (after it has made a TCP
connection with the supernode) while logging in, for example using a version of
STUN protocol (Fig. 2.3); after determined, it stores the info.
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2.6 Call Placement
In this work only calls between peers already present in the buddy-list have been
analyzed and studied. Of course, one call to a peer that is not present in a buddy-
list is just like a normal call, preceded by the “user search” mechanism. It is
important to note that call signalling is always exchanged in a TCP connection.
If between the caller and callee there is neither a NAT nor a firewall, the caller
establishes a direct TCP connection to the callee. Thereafter the caller sends
messages, inside a challenge-respone mechanism, to all the Skype nodes he knows.
In fact, Skype keeps track of online nodes in the Skype network so that it can
connect to one of them if its Supernode becomes unavailable. This table of online
nodes is called “Alternate Node Table”. After signalling has been exchanged, the
peers start the media transfer over a direct UDP flow.
If one of the two peers is behind a NAT, the TCP connection is placed with
a third node, which will forward the packets to the callee through another TCP
connection. But if no firewall is present, the media will also flow through this node,
but over UDP. If also a UDP-restricted firewall is present, the TCP connections
(caller-third node, third node-callee) will carry also the media flow.
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Overview of Previous Research
Work
As the use of Skype spreads and increases in importance, there is a need for tools
and techniques to analyze Skype traffic; it is also becoming a problem for network
administrators, since Skype´s algorithms are not available for public inspection,
which impedes evaluation from a security perspective. Skype operations from
network point of view and Skype protocol reversing [4] analysis is one of the
various studies done over Skype.
3.1 Protocol Reversing
From these analyses it has been developed traffic signatures that allow a third
party monitoring entity to detect the usage of the Skype application. A signature
needs to meet some criteria in order to be useful.
 It should be as compact as possible. A complex signature complicates the
monitoring unit which results in decreased performance with multiple con-
current traffic patterns to monitor.
 The signature should consider all possible cases how traffic could be injected
in the network; otherwise Skype sessions might evade detection.
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 The number of detected false positives, i.e. the detection of a Skype session
if in reality no Skype session was established, should optimally be zero.
By analyzing UDP packet flows it has been possible to identify some patterns. For
example a sort of ID; a 16-bits long section that uniquely identifies the message.
It seems to be randomly selected, put in the sender query and copied in the
receiver reply. Another part of the message is used for underlining the payload
type. It is a 5-bits long field obfuscated into a byte (byte 3). Three random bits
can be easily removed by considering a 0x8f bitmask. The rest of the message
is the frame, that contains a multiplexed sequence of information (that has been
previously ciphered) and voice blocks. The ID and payload identification sequence
are part of the so-called SoM header (Start of message). This part of the message
can only be obfuscated and not ciphered. In fact Skype uses both UDP and
TCP as transport protocol. While TCP implements a connection-oriented reliable
transport protocol and the application is guaranteed to receive all data segments,
and furthermore in-same-sequence they have been inserted in the network. UDP
no longer guarantees all in-sequence data delivery. Therefore Skype receiver must
extract from the application layer header some additional information to detect
and eventually deal with some losses; as said, it comes that the information cannot
be protected by means of a stream cypher, but can only be obfuscated by means
of some function based only on a single packet payload.
3.2 Skype Traffic
Voice over IP has become more and more popular in the wired network, but since
all the operators are starting offering large data rates in UMTS, it can also make
it a suitable environment. Anyway, the success of any new application/service is
strictly connected with the user satisfaction, and in the Skype-specific case with
voice-quality that is perceived. It is interesting to analyze the achievable and the
actual quality of IP-based telephony using Skype [9].The result shows if Skype is
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able to keep pace with the existing mobile telephony systems and how it reacts
to different network characteristics.
The work comprises the “Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality” (PESQ) in
order to evaluate voice quality, packet loss, inter-packet delay and the throughput.
It has been emulated the UMTS rate control mechanisms by restricting the link
data rate with a traffic-shaping router. In this case, Skype does not react to packet
loss, for example increasing the throughput. The measurement in a public UMTS
environment revealed that capacity offered by UMTS is sufficient to make mobile
VoIP call possible. Anyway, due to network jitter and the use of different codecs
used by Skype, sometimes the PESQ were better in the simulation environment
than in the real one. The important aspect is that, Skype, after influencing and
changing the fixed telephony world, would be suitable also for a big expansion in
the mobile one. It is already possible to buy handsets that are Skype-software
capable, and when in the future they will become more and more common, and
the network data rate higher, an application like Skype will start to “scare” also
mobile operators.
3.3 Skype Relayed Traffic
Networked applications are using network resources in increasingly ingenious ways
in order to achieve high scalability and circumvent security limitations. One
example is the emergence of relay nodes -application running the same application.
As already written, the use of relays allows two nodes that could not otherwise
communicate (due to firewall or NAT) to do so, and can improve the quality
of the communication between two nodes by avoiding congested or faulty paths.
Of course this design has some disadvantages from the perspective of users and
network operators. A node chosen to be and to act as a relay must, of course, bear
more traffic, his own and the relaying one. The cost is evident to users in the form
of slower communication (in fact, part of the bandwidth would be used by relayed
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traffic) and financial cost (if the payment system is based upon the quantity of
traffic exchanged). Network operators and small ISPs see only drawbacks, as
relayed traffic increases the amount of traffic exchanged in the network. It easy to
check that a Skype application could relay more than 1 Gigabyte of voice traffic in
15 days. These are all valid points for explaining a characterization of the nature
of relayed traffic and a detection of its presence in the network. Network operators
would like to know if and which traffic is being relayed through hosts that belong
to their network.
In [10] relayed traffic created by Skype is characterized, and a methodology
for detecting it is proposed. Several metrics have been proposed to characterize
the nature of multimedia relayed traffic. Detection is performed by setting up
thresholds for the metrics taken into consideration. By tuning the thresholds,
the desired balance between true positives and true negatives can be obtained.
After this a detection methodology for a large aggregate of traffic traces can be
applied. Usually a good classification method relied over port number, but as
explained, this information is not useful for Skype, since the application is more
flexible and diverse than older applications. In [10] neither this nor protocol-
specific information is taken into consideration. Only the fact that Skype trasmits
multimedia traffic is taken into consideration. Another problem is also how to
identify relayed traffic inside the aggregate one.
In this paper a flow is defined as a sequence of packets with the same 5-
tuple (source and destination IP addresses, source and destination port numbers,
protocol number). But this “definition” needs some additions, as for example the
direction of the flow. Another requirement is a maximum amount of time elapsed
between two adjacent packets in a flow. It is also important to add the notion
of burst of packets, that can characterize relayed traffic. A burst of packets is
a contiguous piece of a flow and is defined as a sequence of packets that has a
minimum average data rate (for example 10 kbps) and a minimum duration (for
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example at least 30 seconds). For detecting the start and the end of a burst it is
possible to use many algorithms, such as EWMA (Exponential Weighted Moving
Average):
Ai = (1− α)Ai−1 + αIi (3.1)
where Ii represents the average data rate of the i-th second of the flow and A0 and
I0 are set to zero. Usually it is updated each second and when Ai goes beyond a
certain threshold a flow is considered started. If Ai goes below that threshold the
flow is considered finished. Different metrics are used:
 the difference between the start times of bursts i and j
 the difference between the end times of bursts i and j
 the ratio between the number of bytes carried by bursts i and j
 the maximum cross correlation between time series corresponding to the
total number of bytes sent
These metrics should be used together in order to detect relayed traffic; but it
is shown that the gain is not much higher than using them separately. This
occurs because somehow the metrics are correlated. It should be noted that these
metrics do not take in consideration Skype protocol, in fact in some experiments
traffic generated by applications other than Skype are misclassified as being Skype-
relayed traffic.
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Time and Spectral analysis
In this study Skype traffic traces have been analyzed. These traces have been
collected inside the faculty’s campus network at the Politecnico di Milano. The
networking infrastructure, which consists of thousands of workstations equipped
with a variety of operating systems, is composed of several 1000Based-TX layer-2
segments routed through Linux-based processor boxes. Connectivity is provided
to end users by either 100BaseT links or 802.11b/g Access Points.
All experiments were performed using Skype version 3.1.0.152 on Windows
machines and Skype version 1.3.0.53 API version on Linux machines. Each ma-
chine had a 10/100 Mb/s Ethernet card. The portion of the network used as
testbed was composed of six machines with Linux as Operating System and one
machine with Windows as Operating System, as shown in figure 4.1.
Different experiments were performed under three different network setups. In
the first setup, both Skype users were on machines that had a direct connection.
In the second setup, one firewall was enabled between the two hosts, caller and
callee, forcing Skype to route the call through a third node, acting as a relay-node,
in the external network. In the third setup all UDP traffic has been blocked, so
that a TCP connection was used for transmitting the media between caller and
callee. During the tests different kinds of media were sent through the System:
1) Music
2) Voice
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Figure 4.1: Part of the Network used for the experiments
3) Silence
It is important to underline that no differences have been found in the analyzed
traces depending on the media that was delivered. Both analyses in time domain
and frequency domain are independent on the delivered media. Even the Power
Spectral Densities do not reflect any changes. This can be explained by the
fact that in packets building process, after the codec, there is a multiplexer, an
archiver and a cypher, as in figure 2.4. It means that the final traffic shape and the
characteristics are not only given by the codec, but by all the different elements
concurring in building the packets. Another point is that there are no differences
between a direct call and a relayed one. The important factor is the transport
layer used, UDP or TCP.
4.1 Time Domain: UDP calls
The first test that was performed consisted in a direct call between caller and
callee, using UDP as transport layer. The trace was collected and analyzed
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Figure 4.2: Byterate of a direct call, UDP flow, sampling rate = 0.5 s
through Tcpdump, the information required (timestamps and packet) gathered
through “bash” commands on a Linux machine. The first thing that was checked
was the Byterate. It was computed with a sampling interval of 0.5 sec; as it can
be seen from figure 4.2 at the beginning of the call the byterate is almost twice
than in the rest of the call.
It can be noticed from figure 4.3 and 4.4 that this is caused not by a higher
packetrate (that keeps being constant) but by greater packets lengths. This,
can be explained either by a sort of “training” period of the codec, or, more
realistically, by the switch to a different codec, or framing policy more suitable
to the network situation. This “transition” perdiod lasts at least 30 seconds each
call, so quite a long time, during which anyway, caller and callee do not experience
any kind of problems. As it can be seen from figure 4.5 the majority of the packets
have a length between 100 and 150 bytes. It is also interesting to underline the
presence of many packets that are 36 bytes-long, sent almost each 20 seconds
23
CHAPTER 4. TIME AND SPECTRAL ANALYSIS
Figure 4.3: Packetrate of a direct call, UDP flow, sampling rate = 0.5 s
Figure 4.4: Packet-Lenghts of a direct call, UDP flow
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Figure 4.5: Probability Density Function of packets length of a direct call, UDP flow
(figure 4.4). It seems that they carry some kind of signalling, in addiction to
that one carried by the TCP connection. In fact, even if the media is on a UDP
flow, there is always a TCP connection between the two hosts (with characteristic
ports used by Skype, that could be also chosen by the user) that exchanges a few
packets at regular interval times.
Regarding the interarrival time almost all the packets arrive in 30 milliseconds
after the previous one (figure 4.7). If the call is routed through Internet using a
third host as relay, on average the same results are obtained.
4.2 Time Domain: TCP calls
As already written, the second test consisted in analyzing a direct call between
caller and callee for which Skype was forced to choose TCP transport layer.
In order to force Skype to choose a TCP connection, a firewall blocking all
the packets between caller and callee has been enabled. In this case the byterate
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Figure 4.6: Interarrival time of a direct call, UDP flow
Figure 4.7: Probability Density Function of Interarrival time of a direct call, UDP flow
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Figure 4.8: Byterate of a direct call, TCP flow, sampling rate = 0.5 s
at the beginning is also higher than in the rest of the call (figure 4.8), but the
difference is lower than in the UDP case. This is because of the way in which the
TCP packet is composed, and because of the features that distinguish TCP from
UDP: ordered data transfer, retransmission of lost packets, discarding duplicate
packets, error-free data transfer, congestion/flow control.
In fact, even if we can notice a sort of training period at the beginning of
the call, fig 4.10, regarding packets length trend, shows a deep difference with the
UDP case. It is much more costant on average, but with a greater variance around
it. Same thing for the packet rate (figure 4.9), on average packets are longer (since
error-free data transfer and congestion-flow control features each packet carries
more information than the necessary) as it can be seen also from figure 4.11. In
this situation it is also difficult to recognize the regular pattern of the “signalling”
packets 36 bytes long from the figure 4.10, but from figure 4.11 it can be noticed
the presence of these packets. The features offered by TCP can be easily noticed
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Figure 4.9: Packetrate of a direct call, TCP flow, sampling rate = 0.5 s
Figure 4.10: Packet-Lenght of a direct call, TCP flow
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Figure 4.11: Probability Density Function of packet length of a direct call, TCP flow
also from figure 4.12 and 4.13 which strongly differ from the relative ones of the
first type of tests. It is also interesting to mark the fact that the packet rate is
no longer constant, but in two point of the trace it is a bit higher. If we compare
this graphic with figure 4.12, it is possible to notice that these points correspond
to two spikes in the second graph. In fact in figure 4.12 there are two high spikes,
caused by some kind of congestion quickly solved by TCP, and the interarrival
times are spread over a larger interval.
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Figure 4.12: Interarrival time of a direct call, TCP flow
Figure 4.13: Probability Density Function of Interarrival time of a direct call, TCP flow
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Figure 4.14: PSD computed with Pwelch method of a UDP connection. Byterate, sampling period
0.5 s
4.3 Frequency Domain
During this work the Power Spectral Densities (PSD) of the characteristics ana-
lyzed in the time domain have also been studied (from figure 4.14 to figure 4.19).
As already reported no differences have been found between calls with different
type of media delivered by the streams. The PSD of Byterate in the TCP case
seems to exhibit a sort of periodicity around the RTT time. This periodicity
leads to the presence of two spikes in figure 4.19 that represents the PSD of the
Interarrival Time function.
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Figure 4.15: PSD computed with Pwelch method of a UDP connection. Length
Figure 4.16: PSD computed with Pwelch method of a UDP connection. Interarrival Time
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Figure 4.17: PSD computed with Pwelch method of a TCP connection. Byterate, sampling period
0.5 s
Figure 4.18: PSD computed with Pwelch method of a TCP connection. Length
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Figure 4.19: PSD computed with Pwelch method of a TCP connection. Interarrival Time
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Time-Domain Analysis Tool for
Estimating the Hurst Parameter
of Internet Traffic and its
Applicability over Skype Traffic
In this chapter concepts like Long-Range Dependence and Self-Similarity are in-
troduced and discussed; their use in Internet traffic analysis it is also addressed.
5.1 Self Similarity
Self-similarity and Fractal properties are concepts introduced by Benoit Mandel-
brot [11] that describe the property for which a certain object characteristic, for
example some statistical property of a temporal serie, keeps being constant re-
spect to dilatation in both axes. If an object has self-similar characteristics, once
Figure 5.1: Cantor-2D set, obtaining dilating the original object for a third of its size at each
iteration
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dilated these characteristics are the same and indiscernible. A classic example is
the Cantor set (figure 5.1), obtained from a single square. It can be noticed that,
zooming a particular, it keeps being the same than the original one. Talking about
internet traffic, for example number of TCP connections, packets arrival processes
or others, the definition of self-similarity is not enough, but it is important to add
the concept of stocastical self-similarity.
For example, in a temporal sequence it can be noticed that after a dilatation
some characteristics are exactly the same. Given a temporal sequence X(t), if
(X(t1), X(t2),......, X(tn)) and (X(t1+k), X(t2+k),......, X(tn+k)) have the same
joint distribution, the process is said stationary. Called Xk the process shifted by
k, this property could be summarized as:
X
d
= Xk (5.1)
Usually it is really hard to find a stationary process in a strict sense, so it is more
common to use a “weaker” definition of stationarity, called stationarity of second
order and it states that in a stationary process the mean of the autocovariance is
the same even if the time interval is shifted. Defined:
γ(r, s) = E [(X(r)− µ)(X(s− µ))] (5.2)
the autocovariance function of the process, it should be valid that:
γ(r, s) = γ(r + k, s+ k) (5.3)
for each value of r, s and k. If a process is self-similar then γ(r, s) = γ(r− s, 0) =
γ(k). It is possible to statistically define also the aggregate process, that is the
process obtained from the dilatation in the time-domain. Defined:
X(m) =
∑mi
t=m(i−1)+1X(t)
m
(5.4)
the aggregate process at level m, obtained partitioning the X(t) process in differ-
ent and non-overlapping intervals, it is possible to associate the autocovariance
function γ(m) defined by 5.3.
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The process X(t) is called self-similar of the second order with Hurst parameter
H, with (0 < H < 1) if
γ(k,H) = γ(m)(k,H) (5.5)
that means the autocovariance properties of the original process are equal to those
of the aggregate one. It is possible to have a similar definition starting from the
aggregate process Y (t), connected to X(t) by
X(t) = Y (t)− Y (t− 1) (5.6)
The process Y (t) can be defined self-similar with Hurst parameter (0 < H < 1)
and it is called H-ss if, for each a > 0 and t > 0:
Y (t)
d
= a−HY (at) (5.7)
The process Y (t) so defined is not stationary since the presence of the factor
a−H , and it has not the stationarity property of the second order. There are
anyway some processes with stationary increments [12]. In this case X(t) has the
stationary property and so it is self-similar of the second order. These processes
are defined H-sssi (H-self similar stationary increments). One important case of
H-sssi process it is represented by Fractionary Brownian movement (FBM), that
is the only Gaussian self-similar process with stationary increments, so it is really
important.
With a H-sssi process and t = 1, a = t, we have
Y (t)
d
= tHY (1) (5.8)
from it, it follows
E
[
Y 2(t)
]
= σ2t2H (5.9)
This result, that shows the non-stationarity property of the process Y (t), is
used for calculating the autocovariance γ(k). It is important to understand how
this self-similarity property of Y (t) described by 5.7 is connected to that one
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defined for the process X(t). The process X(m)(t) can be seen as a result of an
average process
X(m)(t) =
∑m
t=1X(t)
m
= m−1(Y (m)−Y (0)) = m−1mH(Y (1)−Y (0)) = mH−1X(t)
(5.10)
so, if Y (t) is a H-sssi process, its incremental process X(t) accomplishes
X(t)
d
= m1−HX(m)(t) (5.11)
The 5.11 shows that X(m)(t) and X(t) are connected by a simple dilatation func-
tion subject to the Hurst parameter H.
This parameter has a really important role in defining the object properties
[12]. It is clear when calculating the variance of X(m)(t). Knowing that the mean
(Z¯) of a random variable Z accomplies
V ar(X(m)) =
σ2Z
m
(5.12)
where m is the number of points, the variance of the aggregate process can be
obtained from
Var(X(m)) = σ2m2H−2 (5.13)
Hurst parameter is important in determining the variability properties of the
aggregate process.
The most important case is when 0.5 ≤ H ≥ 1, where
Var(X(m)) = σ2m−β (5.14)
with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 (and H = 1 − β
2
). The 5.14 shows that the variance of the
aggregate process hyperbolically converges to 0, so in a slower way than when the
variance is computed following 5.12. This characteristic implies the presence of a
long range memory property in the process.
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5.2 Long-range Dependence
Long-range dependence (LRD) is a property that marks the presence, inside a pro-
cess, of an important kind of memory, and the fact that the auto-correlation func-
tion doesn’t converge. In particular, being r(k) = γ(k)/σ2 the auto-correlation
function of a X(t) self-similar process, it can be computed that for H 6= 0.5
r(k) ∼ H(2H − 1)k2H−2 k →∞ (5.15)
Equation 5.15 marks the importance of parameterH in determining the asymp-
totic trend of the auto-correlation function [12]. For 0.5 ≤ H ≤ 1:
r(k)→ ck−β β = 2− 2H (5.16)
that implies
∞∑
k=−∞
r(k) =∞ (5.17)
The autocorrelation function has an hyperbolic trend, causing r(k) not to con-
verge. When 5.17 is true, the X(t) process is said long-range dependent, if not,
it is said short-range dependent. A similar definition of LRD can be also given
in the spectral domain. In fact the PSD of the process can be expressed for a
long-range dependent process as
Γ(ν) ∼ c|ν|−α α > 0 (5.18)
It is important to underline that there are LRD processes that do not have the
self-similarity property and there are self-similar processes that are not LRD. Only
when 0.5 < H < 1 a H-sssi process has the long-range dependancy.
5.3 Power-law Model
The LRD property is detectable, as said, because of the particular shape of the
power spectral density of the process X(t). The PSD is described by a power law
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model, this is why it is indicated as power-law. The one-sided power spectrum of
X(t) can be espressed as
(f) =
{
1
(2pi)2
∑0
α=−4 hα+2f
α 0 ≤ f ≤ fh,
0 f > fh
(5.19)
where fh is a cut-off frequency for limiting the spectrum. The five power-low noise
types with integer α are: White Phase Modulation (WPM), for α = 0, Flicker
Phase Modulation (FPM), for α = −1, White Frequency Modulation (WFM), for
α = −2, Flicker Frequency Modulation (FFM), for α = −3 and Random Walk
Frequency Modulation (RWFM) for α = −4. It is also possible that α is not an
integer; in that case it is common talking about Fractional Noise [12].
5.4 Modified Allan Variance
In time and frequency measurement theory, a well-known tool in the time domain
for stability characterization of precision oscillators is the Allan Variance.
This variance was proposed in 1981 by modifying the definition of the two
sample variance recommended by IEEE in 1971 for characterization of frequency
stability [13], following the pioneering work of D.W. Allan in 1966 [14] Allan
Variance is a particular case in a family of variances, said M-Sample Variance,
defined for characterizing power-law signals given a finite number M of samples.
These variances are defined as
σ2y(M,T, τ) =
1
M − 1
M∑
i=1
(
y¯i − 1
M
M∑
j=1
y¯j
)2
(5.20)
where τ is, as usual, the period where the mean of y(t) is computed and T is the
period between two different samples. This quantity is itself a stocastic variable
of which it is possible to compute the mean.
Compared to the poor performances of this Variance against white and flicker
phase noise, the Modified Allan Variance (MAVAR) discriminates all power-law
40
CHAPTER 5. TIME-DOMAIN ANALYSIS TOOL
noise types recognized so far. Given an infinite sequence xk of samples evenly
spaced in time with sampling period τ0, the MAVAR is defined as
Mod σ2y(nτ0) =
1
2n2τ 20
〈[
1
n
n∑
j=1
(xj+2n − 2xj+n + xj)
]2〉
(5.21)
where the observation interval is τ=nτ0. In practical measurements, given a finite
set of N samples xk, spaced with sampling period τ0, an estimate of MAVAR can
be computed using the ITU-T standard estimator
Mod σ2y(τ) =
1
2n4τ 20 (N − 3n+ 1)
N−3n+1∑
j=1
[
n+j−1∑
i=j
(xi+2n − 2xi+n + xi)
]2
(5.22)
with n=1,2,...,bN/3c. A recursive algorithm for fast computation of this estimator
exists, which cuts down the number of operations to ∼ N instead of ∼N2.
5.5 Application of MAVAR
The behaviour of the MAVAR on real IP traffic traces was finally tested. Traces
have been obtained thanks to Tcpdump used on off-the-shelf hardware in the
same environment of the previous tests. At first a TCP connection was analyzed,
then the attention was moved to a direct UDP call. A third experiment was run
with a firewall between caller and callee, in order to force Skype to route the call
through a relay peer. Once traces were obtained, some characteristics of the flows
were analyzed. These are packets-length, byterate and interarrival times between
two following packets. These characteristics are series of samples, acquired with
a certain sampling period from the tcpdump traces (e.g., for the byterate, τ=5
ms) over a measurement interval T of about 10 minutes. In the following tests
the beginning and the end of the traces have not been analyzed in order to avoid
transitory effects that would have affected the results. No nonstationary trends,
such as steps, are evident. The Hurst parameter of a LRD sample realization xk
can be computed following this procedure:
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1. Compute MAVAR (τ) with the estimator 5.22, based on the data sequence
xk;
2. Estimate its average slope µ in a log-log plot, at least in some intervals of
values of τ , by best fitting a straight line to the curve (e.g., by least square
error);
3. If -3 ≤ µ ≤-2 (i.e., -1≤ α ≤0, 0 ≤ γ ≤1) get the estimate of the Hurst
parameter as
H =
µ
2
+ 2 (5.23)
It is worthwhile noticing that the stimate of MAVAR computed from a finite
number of samples is a random variable itself. Its variance can be computed and
used to assess the uncertainty of the estimate of H.
In the next section some log-log plots of the MAVAR are shown. As it can be
seen, these plots do not give too much information about the streams, meaning
that MAVAR is not useful in characterizing these traces.
MAVAR plots In the next pages some log-log plots of the MAVAR are shown.
As it can be seen, these plots do not give exhaustive information about the
streams, meaning that MAVAR is not useful in characterizing these kind of traces.
Some plots show characteristics that can be easily misclassified as white noise,
making this analysis useless. In some other plots the unceirtainty of the mea-
surement is too high to infer meaningful results. It can easily noted that in many
plots the graph is not composed by straight lines, making a traffic characterization
almost impossible.
Beside the Byterate-case, where we can assume a sort of LRD property, these
graphs show us how in this kind of traffic there is property of LRD or Self-
Similarity. In Byterate-case of a direct UDP call (figure 5.3) the slope of the
line is α=-3, which corresponds to White Noise. This means that either the
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Figure 5.2: MAVAR of Skype traffic trace for a direct UDP call. Samples are Byterate
Figure 5.3: MAVAR of Skype traffic trace for a direct UDP call. Samples are Length
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Figure 5.4: MAVAR of Skype traffic trace for a direct UDP call. Samples are Interarrival
Figure 5.5: MAVAR of Skype traffic trace for a direct TCP call. Samples are byterate
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Figure 5.6: MAVAR of Skype traffic trace for a direct TCP call. Samples are length
Figure 5.7: MAVAR of Skype traffic trace for a direct TCP call. Samples are Interarrival
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Figure 5.8: MAVAR of Skype traffic trace for a rely-routed UDP call. Samples are byterate
Figure 5.9: MAVAR of Skype traffic trace for a rely-routed UDP call. Samples are length
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Figure 5.10: MAVAR of Skype traffic trace for a rely-routed UDP call. Samples are Interarrival
traffic presents a LRD property with Hurst parameter H = 0.5 or the trace is
affected by so much noise making useless this kind of analysis.
One reason is that this kind of property can be more realitically found in
aggregate traffic and not in a single traces as this work were trying to show.
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Statistical Traffic Classification
The motivation for the need of real-time streams classification, expecially in case of
Skype, has already been exposed. As written, traffic classification is fundamental
in planning and controlling a network.
Four different classification methods have been presented:
 Header-based methods focus on classification relying on information that
can be found directly inside the header of the protocol at the transport
layer used for the streams.
 Payload-based methods focus on classification on data insided the payload
of the packets forming the stream.
 Statistical classification algorithms use statistical parameters computed over
different characteristics, easily and directly obtained by the stream.
 Hybrid algorithms use the previous methods together, trying to obtain a
better quality of the classifier, but usually increasing the computational
complexity of the classification algorithm.
Knowing the origin of a traffic stream allows network administrators to apply
different policies for each attempt of accessing to the network. For example it
is possible to reserve resources to particular applications in order to give better
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quality service to critical traffic, or particularily demanding in capacity, delays,
or jitter. Another possibility is to deny the access from potentially dangerous
activities, or generically not required or authorized.
At the same time, many network planning related problems as capacity plan-
ning, routing planning, work-load modellization and characterization could find
benefits from an accurate stream classification. In fact, if during the projecting
step it is possible to know which links will be used by one or more particular types
of traffic, it could be possible to plan in a better way resources in order to reach
better quality with similar costs.
In order to reach these benefits, it is important to have a realtime identification
process, therefore the classification must be done in the shortest time possible in
order to apply the necessary policy. This point sets principally two limits to the
algorithm that will be implemented by the classifier:
 It must use information that could be gathered during the first seconds
of the stream, not using parameters, like connection length, that need the
knowledge of the entire stream.
 It must be computationally not hard, even if more complex algorithms could
give better results, they require higher computational times.
Some of these methods need information that can be easily obtained from the
packet header, while others need the computation of more complex statistics, such
as the average packets length, or others that need statistical correlation quantities
among different streams and connection requests.
Progressive complications added in the classification algorithms had not only
the aim of improving performances, but were often necessary in order to by-pass
problems and particular situations created by the evolution of the network.
The incredible spread of peer-to-peer applications and the still on-going growth
of audio-video services added new problems and difficulties, making quite useless
previous methods.
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Figure 6.1: ISO-OSI stack
6.1 Header-based Method
One of the first methods that has been thought for identifying easily and quickly
different applications was based on using transport layer port numbers. It is known
that according to OSI standard (Open System Interconnection) introduced in 1978
by ISO, it is possible to divide network protocols in a stack composed of seven
layers, according to tasks they perform. Figure 6.1 represent the ISO-OSI stack.
This model has been introduced for simplifying and regulating the functioning
of a networking communication system. Each layer implements different services
and it passes them to the upper layer, through standard interfaces called PoS
(Point of Service). In this way it is possible to modify algorithms at a certain
layer withouth affecting other layers.
Layer four is the transport layer, and its task is to safely and reliably deliver
data. The most common protocols are, as known, TCP (Transmission Control
Protocol) and UDP(User Datagram Protocol). The difference is that TCP can
assure a reliable, in-order packets delivery, suitable for applications that need
high reliability. Different kinds of applications that can afford lower reliability,
but faster delivery usually rely on UDP.
Both protocols use port numbers for identifying applications that transmit and
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Figure 6.2: Some well-known ports
receive data on the end-points. Each packet is marked as belonging to a particular
stream through destination port number and source port number present inside
the packet header of layer-4 protocol.
TCP/UDP port number could be divided into three groups:
 Well-known ports (0-1023), to which applications are statically referred.
(figure 6.2)
 Registered ports (1024-49151)
 Dynamic or private ports (49152-65535)
Theoretically it would be possible to identify an application simply looking at
the used port number.
Anyway this technique is nowadays able to give only a little information, since
many applications use not-standard ports for communicating.
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Many of the famous peer-to-peer file-sharing or audio-video conference appli-
cations, try to avoid fixed ports, using dinamically chosen ports. Some examples
are applications like Skype or BitTorren. They can change ports, but they can
also use well-known port, like port 80, usually left for web-access.
6.2 Payload-based Method
A second method that can be used is the analysis of the packets payload.
This technique works at level seven of ISO/OSI stack, and consists in searching
inside the payloads a special bytes sequence, called signature, that is characteristic
of a particular software. Many classification softwares implement this strategy,
usually with IP addresses, or port numbers analysis, since it is a really good and
precise method to use, once a reliable signature has been found.
One example of these softwares is SNORT [15], that through rules written
following a particular format, is able to identify different streams and to apply
different policies depending on the application found.
A fundamental drawback of these systems is that it is necessary to store and
update the signatures in order to respond to the developments and upgrades of the
softwares. In addition, finding a rule, strict enough to not affect other streams,
could be hard.
Another point is that this type of analysis is time consuming and computa-
tionally heavvy, expecially in high speed links, where the number of packets is
really high.
In the end, this method, even if theoretically valid, is not practical. If we add
the fact that nowadays more and more applications crypt data, it is useless.
6.3 Statistical Classification
As already mentioned there is a different classification method. This method
relies on statistical characteristics of the streams in order to reach an application
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classification. The principal benefit of this kind of methods is that they can be
used on each type of traffic, also crypted, since they do not need any kind of
payload inspection.
The most used characteristics are the distributions of packets length and in-
terarrival times that can be easily obtained from the analysis of a stream with
any kind of origin. These characteristics often contain information that can be
used for classification.
In general, a parameter is considered not good if:
 It does not add any kind of information about the knowledge if the stream.
 It is correlated with the info given by some other parameter.
In fact, a parameter that adds no information is totally useless and so there
is no necessity for computing it. On the other hand, a parameter that gives an
information already gained in some other way can be even harmful.
In order to gather the best possible parameters, two methods have been
thought.
 Methods based on filtering elaborate information from the training set for
determining the “quality” of the parameters.
 Wrapper methods use the same classification algorithms for determining
the “quality” of a parameter, making the classifiers using different ones, and
taking those who give better results.
In [16] the authors show how, using a k-NN algorithm (Nearest Neighbour) it
is possible to classify streams belonging to seven different traffic classes, with an
error rate lower than 10%. Statistical parameters used are:
 Average packet length
 Byterate
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 Packetrate
 Mean Square value of packet length
while the seven different traffic classes are:
 DNS
 FTP (data)
 HTTPS
 Kazaa
 realmedia
 telnet
 WWW
As can be noticed, the statistical parameters refer to length and numbers of
stream packets, while traffic classes are heterogeneous, able to cover a huge variety
of applications.
In [17] the authors use a more complex classifier, called Bayesian, based upon
Bayes theorem and prior probabilities.
The traffic classes considered by the authors are:
 WWW
 mail (POP3, SMTP)
 ftp (data)
 SSH-telnet
 Database (sqlnet, etc)
 DNS
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 Peer-to-peer
 Games (Half life)
 Attack (virus, works, etc)
 Multimedia (realmedia)
Also in this case, the set is really wide and heterogeneous, covering many
possible applications.
The algorithm could also be expressed mathematically. If cj is the traffic class
j-th and y the stream to be classified, it is possible to write, by the Bayes theorem,
that:
p(cj | y) = p(cj)f(y | cj)∑
k p(ck)f(y | ck)
(6.1)
where f(y | cj) is the distribution probability function of y, given cj, while the
denominator works as a normalizing constant.
The algorithm needs a training period for determining the prior probabilities
p(cj) and the distribution probability function f(y | cj) for each class.
A simple method for computing f(y | cj) is to presume that it has a Gaussian
probability distribution with mean and variance computable from the stream.
In the article, actually, it is demostrated as the Gaussian assumption is too
far from the reality for many kind of streams, and the probability error for this
classifier is around 35 %.
Anyway it is possible to improve the classification simply considering different
distribution for different application. In this case 93,50 % of the streams were
correctly classified.
Besides the statistics related to lengths and interarrival times, it is also shown
in [18] that other characteristics, such as TCP flag, can help in traffic classification.
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6.4 Hybrid Algorithms
A different method for traffic classification uses more techniques at the same time,
in order to by-pass problems caused by one method and to take advantage of the
benefits given by another one.
The method proposed in [19] aims to analyze the host behaviour at three
different levels:
 Social: the host behaviour is analyzed respect to the interaction with other
hosts in the network, for example monitoring the number of hosts in contact,
or checking the presence of hosts community inside the network.
 Functional: the host is analyzed with respect to the role it assumes inside
the network (client, server or peer). A way is to check whether it uses few
or many ports for communicating.
 Applicative: transport layer interactions are checked, comparing stream
characteristics with a pattern of reference, based on various statistics.
This algorithm is of course more complex than others, because in addiction
to the statistics of each stream, it is necessary to keep trace of the behaviour of
the hosts, meaning collecting information about number and type of connections,
way of connection etc.
On average this kind of classifier is able to correctly classify 90 % of streams.
It is important to notice that this mechanism is not able to distinguish different
applications belonging to the same traffic class. It means that it is able to dif-
ferentiate a HTTP stream from a peer-to-peer one, but not eMule traffic from
GNUtella traffic. It has also been shown that with crypted traffic, expecially
where the transport layer header is also crypted, there could be misclassifications.
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Statistical Fingerprinting for
Skype Classification
The approach that has been used through this study tries to classify network
traffic relying exclusively on the statistical properties of the flows. The key idea, as
already shown, is that some statistical properties of basic elements of each network
flow, for example the size of the IP packets, their inter-arrival time and the order
in which they are seen at the classifier should be sufficient to determine which
application has generated the traffic. In this work, the definition of “protocol
fingerprints”, which express the three properties above mentioned is explained in
a compact and efficient way.
Using the definition of anomaly score, the protocol fingerprints used, allow
the measurement of how “far” an unknown protocol is from the basic character-
istics of a given protocol. Then a classification algorithm, based on the protocol
fingerprints, is used for the final classification. The algorithm can classify flows
dynamically as packets pass through the classifier, deciding if a flow belongs to
a given application layer protocol, or if it was generated by an “unknown” (that
means not-fingerprinted) protocol.
The important differences from all the existing approaches are the application
of a smoothing filter on the Probability Density Functions (PDF) of the quantities
expressed in the protocol fingerprints, in order to take into consideration the effect
57
CHAPTER 7. FINGERPRINTING FOR SKYPE CLASSIFICATION
of noisy factors, and the use of packet arrival order as one of the main elements
in the definition of protocol fingerprint. The proposed algorithm is computation-
ally simple: the comparison of a flow against a known fingerprint requires only
the algebraic sum of a few terms obtained by looking up values in PDF tables.
Moreover, the low false positive ratio in the detection of not-fingerprinted traffic
(obtained in the experimental phase and explained later) indicates the effective-
ness of fingerprints for protocol characterization and a certain degree of robustness
of the classifier against the emergence of new application layer protocols can be
reasonably expected. This technique is at a very early stage of development. It
has been tested by Salgarelli in [20] and then a modified version has been used
through this work.
7.1 Protocol Fingerprints
The classification of IP flows produced by Skype protocol through UDP and TCP
flows has been tested. The definition of flow F is a bidirectional, ordered sequence
of IP packets produced either by one peer towards the other, or the way around
during an application layer session. At the IP layer the flow F can be characterized
as an ordered sequence of N pairs Pi=(si,∆ti), with 1 ≤ i ≤ N and N is the total
number of packets in the flow, where si represents the size of the packet i and ∆ti
represents the inter-arrival time between Pkti−1 and Pkti. All the work is based
on the assumption that the statistical information contained in an appropriate
amount of flows generated according to the same application layer protocol rules
should be enough to decide whether an unknown flow is in agreement with such
protocol or not. The information given by these statistical properties is what has
been defined “protocol fingerprint”.
The idea behind the use of packet size, inter-arrival times and arrival order
(of packets) for the classification of network flows lies in the observation that at
least during the beginning stage of each layer-4 connection, the statistics related
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Figure 7.1: Summary fo the procedure used to derive the protocol mask, necessary for the classifi-
cation algorithm
to each of these quantities depend mostly on the application-layer state machine
that has generated the flow.
The generation of a given application layer protocols fingerprint starts from
the evaluation of a set of T Probability Density Functions (PDFi) estimated from
a set of flows (a training set) generated by the same application and captured by
a monitoring device. The i -th PDFi is built on all the i -th pairs Pi belonging
to those flows that are at least i+1 packets long. The objective of the PDFi
is to describe the behaviour of the i -th packet on the three-dimensional plane
(probability, packet-size s, inter-arrival time ∆t) for a certain protocol. In this
way the packets’ arrival order is also taken into consideration, since only all the
i -th packets of the flows in the training set take part to the computation of PDFi.
Variable s is discrete and assumes values in a range dimension according to
the minimum and maximum size of an IP packet in the network interface used
to collect the traces. The plane that has been chosen for computing the PDFs
contains sizes within the range 30-1490 (bytes). Variable ∆t is, instead, sampled
with resolution coherent with the speed of the network interface used to capture
the traffic traces and with the clock resolution of the capture device (tcpdump),
and binned accordingly. It has been decided to bin the values along the (log10)
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∆t-axis from 10−9 to 101 (seconds), with step 0.01. So each resulting PDFi matrix
is 1461x1001. At the end of the training period, chosen the number T of packets
that should be analyzed, the machine prepares a vector of PDFs,
→
PDF , which
length is T .
In order to classify a flow passing inside the classifier, it is necessary to control if
the behaviour of the unknown flow is statistically compatible with the description
given by
→
PDF vector.
7.2 Anomaly Score
The way for doing it is to define an anomaly score S that is able to describe the
“statistical distance” between the training set (and so
→
PDF ) and the unknown
flow F . The value should give the correlation between the unknown flow’s i-
th packet and the application protocol layer described by
→
PDF , that means the
i-th component of the vector. It can be done looking at the value that the i-th
component of
→
PDF assumes in Pi, with Pi being the i-th pair of the unknown flow:
the higher the probability value, the higher the possibility that the unknown flow
has been generated by the same application of
→
PDF . Anyway it is important to
consider the fact that these values are affected by forms of “noise” (variability in
round trip times caused by congestion, differences in the local implementation of
each protocol’s state machine and others). The idea regarding how to take these
problems into account is to consider not only the value in Pi, but also in a region
close to it. This is the exact idea behind the concept of protocol mask
→
M as the
basic component of a protocol fingerprint.
→
M is defined as a vector of T matrices
resulting from the application of a Gaussian smoothing filter to the components
of
→
PDF . After the application of the filter each matrix is rescaled in order to
normalize the sum to 1, according to the general property of a PDF.
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 represent the distribution of a Probability Density Function
before and after the application of the Gaussian Filter.
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Figure 7.2: Probability Density Function
Figure 7.3: Mask obtained smoothing the PDF with a Gaussian Filter
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The Gaussian smoothing operator is a 2-D convolution operator that is used
to “blur” images and remove details and noise. In this sense it is similar to the
mean filter, but it uses a different kernel that represents the shape of a Gaussian
(“bell-shaped”) hump. The idea of Gaussian smoothing is to use this 2-D distri-
bution as a “point-spread” function, and this is achieved by convolution. Since
the image is stored as a collection of discrete pixels we need to produce a discrete
approximation to the Gaussian function before we can perform the convolution.
In theory, the Gaussian distribution is non-zero everywhere, which would require
an infinitely large convolution kernel, but in practice it is effectively zero more
than about three standard deviations from the mean, and so we could truncate
the kernel at this point.
As already explained the i-th component of the anomaly score is a function of
the i-th component of the value of Mi(Pi), and it is defined as follows:
Ai(Pi,Mi) =
1
max(,Mi(Pi))
(7.1)
where  is a small positive quantity. Its function is to let the score be always
finite, even when Mi is zero in Pi.
Starting from this definition of the anomaly score vector
→
A it is possible to
introduce the concept of the anomaly score S of F versus
→
M :
Sn(F,
→
M) =
[
∑n
i=1Ai(Pi,Mi)/n]− Amin
Amax − Amin (7.2)
where n represents the number of packets considered for the classification, and
Amin, Amax are the extreme values of A (respectively, 1 and 
−1). This implies
that 0 ≤ Sn(F,
→
M) ≤ 1. S is a function of n, the number of packets of the flow
that the classifier “sees” during the analysis before taking a decision. All these
vectors take part in the definition of protocol’s fingerprint.
The classification decision is built on protocol’s fingerprint and anomaly score.
The choice of the threshold is important because if the value of the anomaly score
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is below the threshold, then the flow is considered belonging to the group that
originated the fingerprint.
7.3 Using the Technique in Practice
The application of this technique is pretty simple.
There is the need of collecting pre-classified traces of Skype calls in order to
form a training set. This can be easily done with Tcpdump or any other traffic-
capture mechanism available.
Once having the training set it is possible to build the protocol fingerprints
based on the pre-classified traces. After that, it is possible to start the classifica-
tion machine, that would use the protocol fingerprints for deciding the origin of
an unknown flow, extracted from live traffic.
It is important to periodically update the fingerprints, in order to prevent any
misclassification caused by different versions of the applications.
The way the algorithm has been thought allows its application in a dynamic
environment: as the classifier sees more packet of a flow, it can increase the chances
of correctly classifying it.
The validity of the classification algorithm has been tested in the faculty’s
network of Politecnico di Milano. Two thousands calls have been collected at the
beginning of each test in order to build the training set. All the calls were 30
seconds long, collected waiting 1 second between each one. Transported media
has always been music (but as already shown there is no difference for this kind
of tests between silence, music and spoken language). The experimental analysis
was run by following pretty closely what a network administrator would have to
do to implement this classification technique.
All the results were obtained tuning the classifier with the parameters that
seemed to be the best for achieving optimal results. Each fingerprint was obtained
applying a 20 × 20 window size for the Gaussian Smoother and the standard
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Figure 7.4: False-negative Ratio versus mask size
deviation of the function was set equal to 4.55.
The classifier took its decision after the 10th packet of the flow under analysis.
It has been chosen to analyse only 10 packets because in this way a real time use
of the classifier is possible without affecting the quality of the decision. In figure
7.4 it is shown how the mask size affects the false-negative ratio and so the quality
of the classifier. It should be added that the bigger the size, the more complex
the operation of building the Gaussian filter is. Anyway this operation needs to
be done only once, after collecting the traces and then it is enough to save only
the mask vector, so it does not affect the real-time operation of the classifier.
As said, another parameter that was chosen is the standard deviation of the
Gaussian function. In figure 7.5 it is shown how it affects the decisions of the
classifier. It can be easily noted that any value bigger than 1.5 leads to the same
results, it does not affect the decision of the classifier. This is why in all our tests,
the standard deviation was set at 4.55.
The classifier performs quite well as it can be seen in figure 7.6. From the
figure it is possible to realize the performance of the classifier in different tests.
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Figure 7.5: False-negative Ration versus Gaussian function standard deviation
Test 1 consisted of collecting traces from calls between hosts inside the same
network. This was possible thanks to a Java application that automatized the
calls. Then each trace was analyzed by Tcpdump thanks to a Unix bash shell
script. In this way the vectors necessary to the computation of the
→
PDF are built
and then passed to the classifier. In test 2 the caller was in a different network
than the callee. Of course for both of these tests it has been necessary to build
two vectors, the training (with pre-classified traces) and the evaluating one. In
test 3 the training vector from test 1 has been used but the evaluating vector was
the one from test 2, vice versa in test 4. Test 5 and 6 use vectors obtained mixing
traces from test 1 and test 2. In test 7, but also in other tests in which same
results were obtained, the false positive ratio was checked. In fact, in these tests
the evaluating traces did not belong to Skype traffic, but to different Internet
protocols, like FTP or HTTP or media delivering protocol like RTP and RTCP.
In all the tests the False Positive Ratio was equal to 0.
These results should be taken carefully since the study is still at an early stage
and the effective applicability should be studied more. The pre-classification phase
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Figure 7.6: Test 1 has been performed inside the campus network, Test 2 has been perfomed with
calls between one host inside the campus of Politecnico di Milano and one host outside
it. Test 3 and 4 have been performed using Mask from test 3 for valuating data from
test 4 and the way around. In test 5 and 6 the mask has been created mixing data from
test 1 and 2. Test 7 has been performed in order to evaluate false positive ratio (traces
gathered not from Skype traffic).
of the flows for the creation of the training set is still an issue because having pre-
classified traces, expecially in peer-to-peer traffic, is quite demanding and hard to
achieve in an automatic way.
Another important factor is the “transportability” of the fingerprints. It is
not sure that a fingerprint taken at one site could be used for classification at a
different site, even if tests 3 and 4 show low false negative ratios. this needs more
investigations.
Aside from the fingerprints the way the classification algorithm has been
thought implies that the engine could be implemented directly in hardware. This
device would require memory in order to save the number of fingerprints necessary
to classify all the wanted or unwanted traffic in the network.
66
CHAPTER 7. FINGERPRINTING FOR SKYPE CLASSIFICATION
It should be also important to analyse the precision of the device. It is known
that pcap (and so Tcpdump) is not precise but with this level of precision it
seems to be quite accurate in dumping the traces in the environment used for
the tests. There could be problems in networks with higher data-rate but in that
case it could be sufficient to use a proper dedicated hardware for the classification
machine.
Tests 5 and 6 present better results and this can be motivated by the fact that
the training set has been created with twice as many traces as in all the other
tests. In fact, a bigger number of traces belonging to the training set ensures higher
classification quality because of more detailed PDF vectors. It would be interesting
to analyse how deeply this factor influences the overall process. Sometimes it is
not so easy to obtain, store and process large amount of data considering also
the fact that this should be done for each of the known protocols that should
be monitored. This is therefore another open issues that should be taken into
consideration in future works.
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Conclusion and Outlook
In this work an analysis of Skype traffic has been proposed. At the beginning of
the work a general analysis of the Skype protocol has been introduced. Skype has
several features making Skype usage detection hard at network level, which are
unavailable protocol specification, complete encryption of all messages, clandes-
tine port number usage and several different operation modes. Detecting Skype
traffic is not an easy task. Because of Skype’s P2P character, the security oper-
ator has to install monitoring systems at all network egress points to detect all
user operations. Additionally, exact detection of Skype usage in high traffic sce-
narios requires powerful monitoring hardware. After a general overview of Skype
network protocol, an analysis of Skype traffic in both time and frequency domain
has been proposed. It has been already written that Skype protocol hides the
type of traffic transported (file transfers or voice/music/silence media) and that a
“training” period of the call possibly caused by the codec can be observed in the
byterate graph (figure 4.2). A further attempt to characterize the protocol has
been tried with the MAVAR method. In this case the Modified Allan Variance is
not useful and its application over this type of traffic does not give any additional
information.
A new classification method based on statistical fingerprints has been intro-
duced and tested. Protocol fingerprints are quantities that are at the basis of
the training phase, and that express in a efficient way the main statistical prop-
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erties used to classify and characterize each protocol: interarrival time and size
of the packets and the arrival order in which they are seen at the classifier. The
first results have shown good possibilities for this kind of characterization with a
small error ratio. The analyses showed also that the use of the Gaussian filter is
fundamental in helping the classifier to overcome the effects caused by jitter and
unexpected changes in packet sizes.
This algorithm is still at an early stage of development and many issues should
be analysed more deeply, as discussed in Chapter 7. It would be interesting to
better understand the “transportability” of the fingerprints, the importance of the
Gaussian filter (and moreover if any other Smoothing filter could be used with
better results) and a real and effective usage in a public environment. Another
important issue is the validity of the fingerprints since tests suggest that after a
certain time Skype changes traffic characteristics. In fact, we have found that if
the fingerprints are older than one month, the classification algorithm is no longer
effective. Anyway, the good results so far achieved and all these open issues give
motivation to keep working on this technique.
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